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Aditya Vikram
Assistant Professor, Dept of Economic Sciences,
IIT Kanpur
Verified email at iitk.ac.in -
Homepage
mechanism design
auction theory
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Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
A Vikram
Social Choice and Welfare 62 (1), 89-108
, 2024
2024
A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem
A Vikram
Economics Letters 217, 110646
, 2022
2022
Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market
A Vikram
Available at SSRN 4213511
, 2022
2022
Probability-Burning Mechanism with Reserve Price for Single-Good Allocation Problem
A Vikram
Available at SSRN 4084290
, 2022
2022
Essays in Mechanism Design
A Vikram
Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata
, 2021
2021
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