Vasilis Gkatzelis
Cited by
Cited by
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
R Cole, V Gkatzelis
SIAM Journal on Computing 47 (3), 1211-1236, 2018
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
R Cole, NR Devanur, V Gkatzelis, K Jain, T Mai, VV Vazirani, ...
Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments
R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 251-268, 2013
Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games
R Cole, JR Correa, V Gkatzelis, V Mirrokni, N Olver
Games and Economic Behavior 92, 306-326, 2015
Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games
V Gkatzelis, K Kollias, T Roughgarden
Operations Research, 2016
Pricing private data
V Gkatzelis, C Aperjis, BA Huberman
Electronic Markets, 1-15, 2015
Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints
K Yang, V Gkatzelis, J Stoyanovich
Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on …, 2019
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents
S Brânzei, V Gkatzelis, R Mehta
Operations Research, 2021
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture
V Gkatzelis, D Halpern, N Shah
2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2020
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
P Dütting, V Gkatzelis, T Roughgarden
Mathematics of Operations Research 42 (4), 897-914, 2017
Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions
S Banerjee, V Gkatzelis, A Gorokh, B Jin
Proceedings of the 33rd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 22), 2022
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
P Agrawal, E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, T Ou, X Tan
23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC 22), 2022
Positive results for mechanism design without money
R Cole, V Gkatzelis, G Goel
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and …, 2013
Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling
I Caragiannis, V Gkatzelis, C Vinci
Proceedings of the thirteenth conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2017
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service
V Gkatzelis, E Markakis, T Roughgarden
Proceedings of the eighteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation, 2017
The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games
D Fotakis, V Gkatzelis, AC Kaporis, PG Spirakis
Theory of Computing Systems 50 (3), 559-578, 2012
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching
R Abebe, R Cole, V Gkatzelis, JD Hartline
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2020
Fair and efficient memory sharing: Confronting free riders
EJ Friedman, V Gkatzelis, CA Psomas, S Shenker
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (01), 1965-1972, 2019
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions
E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan
14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023), 2023
Optimal data acquisition with privacy-aware agents
R Cummings, H Elzayn, E Pountourakis, V Gkatzelis, J Ziani
2023 IEEE Conference on Secure and Trustworthy Machine Learning (SaTML), 210-224, 2023
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