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soumendu sarkar
soumendu sarkar
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi
Verified email at econdse.org - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Mechanism design for land acquisition
S Sarkar
International Journal of Game Theory 46 (3), 783-812, 2017
242017
Mechanism Design for Land Acquisition
S Sarkar
Indian Statistical Institute, 2015
242015
Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
S Sarkar
Mathematical Social Sciences 93, 37-46, 2018
62018
Bargaining for Assembly
D Gupta, S Sarkar
Working Paper, 2018
52018
Optimal mechanism for land acquisition
S Sarkar
Review of Economic Design 26 (1), 87-116, 2022
32022
Unit Commitment in a Federalized Power Market: A Mixed Integer Programming Approach
P Mitra, S Sarkar, T Mehta, A Kumar
Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, 2022
22022
Auctions, Negotiations and Winner’s Curse in Coal Mining in India
S Sarkar
International Journal of Management Practice 14 (1), 35-48, 2021
22021
Convergence to a first best solution in a model of land acquisition
S Sarkar
Retrieved on 20, 2017
22017
Strategyproof and Budget Balanced Mechanisms for Assembly
S Sarkar
Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, 2022
2022
Bargaining for assembly
S Sarkar, D Gupta
Theory and Decision, 2022
2022
Optimal Redistribution of teachers among public schools
S Sarkar, S Yadav
2021
Assembly problems
D Gupta, S Sarkar
Game Theory and Networks: New Perspectives and Directions, 89-104, 2021
2021
The Land Acquisition Problem: a Mechanism Design Approach
S Sarkar
2012
Predatory Pricing and the Notion of Multi-Market Dominance: A Case of the Indian Telecom Industry
S SARKAR, S SHUKLA
BUSINESS, ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 237, 0
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Articles 1–14