| Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium D Abreu, A Sen Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 997-1021, 1991 | 252 | 1991 |
| Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant‐strategy implementation S Bikhchandani, S Chatterji, R Lavi, A Mu'alem, N Nisan, A Sen Econometrica 74 (4), 1109-1132, 2006 | 210 | 2006 |
| Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition D Abreu, A Sen Journal of Economic theory 50 (2), 285-299, 1990 | 192 | 1990 |
| A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation B Dutta, A Sen The Review of Economic Studies 58 (1), 121-128, 1991 | 171 | 1991 |
| Nash implementation with partially honest individuals B Dutta, A Sen Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 154-169, 2012 | 125 | 2012 |
| Strategy-proof social choice correspondences S Barberà, B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 101 (2), 374-394, 2001 | 103 | 2001 |
| Dictatorial domains N Aswal, S Chatterji, A Sen Economic Theory 22 (1), 45-62, 2003 | 101 | 2003 |
| Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments B Dutta, A Sen, R Vohra Economic Design 1 (1), 173-203, 1994 | 100 | 1994 |
| Separable preferences, strategyproofness, and decomposability ML Breton, A Sen Econometrica 67 (3), 605-628, 1999 | 86 | 1999 |
| Implementation under strong equilibrium: A complete characterization B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Mathematical Economics 20 (1), 49-67, 1991 | 74 | 1991 |
| Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem A Sen Economics Letters 70 (3), 381-385, 2001 | 64 | 2001 |
| Tops-only domains S Chatterji, A Sen Economic Theory 46 (2), 255-282, 2011 | 52 | 2011 |
| Ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results B Dutta, A Sen Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1), 90-101, 1996 | 50 | 1996 |
| Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible voting rules D Majumdar, A Sen Econometrica 72 (2), 523-540, 2004 | 47 | 2004 |
| Random dictatorship domains S Chatterji, A Sen, H Zeng Games and Economic Behavior 86, 212-236, 2014 | 38 | 2014 |
| Random dictatorship domains S Chatterji, A Sen, H Zeng Games and Economic Behavior 86, 212-236, 2014 | 38 | 2014 |
| Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes B Dutta, H Peters, A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 28 (1), 163-179, 2007 | 37 | 2007 |
| The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 12 (3), 277-292, 1995 | 36 | 1995 |
| Understanding when agents are fairmen or gamesmen M Spiegel, J Currie, H Sonnenschein, A Sen Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1), 104-115, 1994 | 34 | 1994 |
| Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction B Dutta, A Sen Social Choice and Welfare 10 (2), 149-160, 1993 | 33 | 1993 |
Bhaskar DuttaProfessor of Economics, University of WarwickVerified email at warwick.ac.uk
